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MURDER BY DESIGN: THE `FEEL-GOOD FACTOR’ AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
The much-publicised recent decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of the 
ischiopagus conjoined twins, Mary and Jodie, should be viewed with considerable 
alarm by criminal lawyers. We find the mood of the Court reminiscent of that in 
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland1. There, too, the criminal law appeared to present an 
inconvenient obstacle to the result desired by all the courts involved. In the case of the 
twins, Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation)2, the courts have again, 
and again outside the context of a criminal trial, found the criminal law to be too 
unbending and inflexible for their purposes. The driving force behind both decisions 
appears to be to be seen to find a justification for the morally `soft option’, giving the 
impression that judges now want to leave their courts bathed in the glow of having been 
seen to do what feels good to the public at large. Criminal law may be left in total 
disarray in consequence, but the Court of Appeal appears remarkably unconcerned on 
that score. In Re A, Ward L.J. observed, “The search for settled legal principle has been 
especially arduous and conducted under real pressure of time”3. On one view, in fact, 
the settled principle was clear; the proposed operation would legally be murder. The 
only arduous aspect of this case from the Court’s point of view was that it was difficult 
to escape this apparently unwelcome conclusion. Nevertheless, it set itself the task of 
finding a way out, apparently so that all concerned (except the parents) could feel a 
comfortable sense of having saved a life4. The Court would not countenance an 
interpretation of the law which involved sitting back and watching the life of both twins 
1 [1993] 1 All E.R. 821. Anthony Bland was 21, but for three years had been in a persistent vegetative 
state following catastrophic injury at the disaster at the Hillsborough Football Stadium in 1989. The 
family and medical team sought a declaration that it would be lawful not to replace the nasogastric 
tubes through which he was fed, nor to provide antibiotic treatment. The Courts at all levels held that 
this would be lawful in this case.
2 [2000] 4 All E.R. 961. 
3 Ibid., at 969
4 This reaction was predicted in S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, `Conjoined Twins: the Legality and 
Ethics of Sacrifice’ (1997) 5 Med. L. Rev. 149
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ebb away. In Bland, the feel-good factor had more to do with sparing the family and 
medical team from having to sit back and watch the ageing process in and gradual 
deterioration of the body of a young man, once fit and vigorous. 
The twins Jodie and Mary were joined at the lower abdomen. They had a common 
artery and shared a bladder. Their spines were fused at the base. Mary had very weak 
cardiac performance and no useful lung function. Jodie’s heart was pumping blood 
around the bodies of both babies, and would ultimately collapse under the strain. The 
medical evidence was that if the twins were not separated, Jodie would die, although 
not immediately. The proposed operation to separate the twins would inevitably lead to 
Mary’s death, because her connection with the common artery would be severed, and 
her own heart could not supply her with sufficient oxygen. She could be kept alive on a 
heart and lung machine, but such machines are normally used for short-term purposes, 
for example, during a surgical operation that would enable the patient to function 
independently afterwards. St Mary’s Hospital, Manchester asked the court for a 
declaration as to the legality of an operation to separate.
The Court of Appeal recognised that at first sight the proposed surgical operation to 
separate the twins appeared to involve the murder of Mary unless some specific defence 
could be invoked5. The majority of their Lordships decided that they could rely on the 
defence of necessity to avoid this difficulty, and so gave a declaration that the operation 
would be lawful. The killing of Mary would be justified by necessity - the need to save 
Jodie’s life. Yet, at common law, necessity is not a defence to murder6. In order to 
justify the declaration in Re A, the Court had to throw away years of legal precedent, 
itself based on moral arguments which were not addressed.7 This enabled the Court of 
5 This operation has now taken place. Mary died, as had been anticipated
6 Dudley and Stephens (1884-5) 14 Q.B.D. 273
7 See paper by Suzanne…?
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Appeal to impose its will on the children’s parents, who live outside its jurisdiction and 
will have to bear the consequences in terms of caring for the surviving twin. Their 
belief that the operation was morally wrong was supported by advice from their 
Church. Thus the Court’s decision overrode both the moral views of the children’s 
parents and established criminal law doctrine. 
The cost is high – hard cases are known to make bad law.  The alterations made in Re A 
to the doctrine of necessity not only create enormous uncertainty; they will inevitably 
draw criminal courts into many cases involving difficult moral issues. The defence of 
necessity works in this way. If the law does not recognize the defence in a murder case 
(which previously it most certainly did not), the judge will not allow the jury to 
consider it. It is not legally available as a defence. But where it is a legal defence, the 
jury has to decide whether the killing was genuinely necessary. They must consider the 
nature of the emergency and whether means other than killing were available to deal 
with it.8. How would a jury respond to that defence being raised where the killing was 
an act of mercy? Is it now the case that a trial judge would have to allow the jury to 
return a verdict of not guilty where they are persuaded that death was `necessary’ as 
euthanasia? The Court of Appeal has opened the door to lawful acquittal where 
euthanasia is the reason for a killing, and it could be only a matter of time before such 
cases are before the courts.
All this is the inevitable consequence of distorting the law in order to achieve a 
utilitarian goal where two lives are at stake. To achieve the `feel-good’ result in a very 
unusual case, we are at risk of having to condone euthanasia by private citizens who 
raise the defence of necessity. However, my main argument here is that there is more 
wrong with Re A than the blatant distortion of the general defences that exist in 
8Martin   [1989] 1 All E.R. 652: Conway [1989] 3 All E.R. 1025
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criminal law. For, in addition to that, the Court of Appeal attempt to disguise the fact 
that at every point of their argument they are engaged in a comparison of the respective 
rights to life of two human beings. The judges, while apparently giving every 
consideration to Mary’s right to life, and while acknowledging the flaws in the 
reasoning employed in Bland, adopt an interpretation of the decision which renders her 
interests to the periphery of the inquiry and which must raise questions as to how much 
value the common law attaches to the sanctity of life. It is proposed to in this paper to 
examine the analysis of murder offered in Re A. This, I suggest, will show that Bland 
charted the wrong course and that the title of Finnis’ note, `Crossing the Rubicon’9 was 
well chosen.
LIFE IN BEING
In neither Bland nor Re A would the courts take the route of deciding that the person 
about whom the declaration was sought did not amount to a life in being capable of 
protection by the criminal law. Only in Re A was the matter specifically addressed,10 
apparently because of the view of some doctors that Mary could be regarded as 
equivalent to a deformity on Jodie’s body. Many of us in fact would be revolted by the 
implication that we can classify who is and who is not a human being on the basis of 
some medical judgment about the number of functioning organs or the capacity to feel 
sensation. Brooke L.J. made the court’s view clear: “In this context11 it is wholly 
illegitimate to introduce considerations that relate to the quality, or the potential quality 
of, each sister’s life”12 What is unclear is why context is the main factor here. We find 
later in the judgment a marked willingness to weigh the value of two lives against each 
9 J. Finnis, `Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?’ (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 329
10 ibid ., Brooke L.J. at 1026, Ward L.J. at  996
11 Author’s emphasis
12Re A  ., supra, at 1026
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other, and consequential erosion in our courts of the principle of the sanctity of life. 
Finnis has shown how unconvincing is the claim made in Bland that the courts will not 
involve themselves in eugenics.13
 
ANALOGY WITH BLAND
To prove murder by the doctors, a prosecutor would have to show that they performed 
an act, or omitted to act where they have a duty to act, in a fashion which caused the 
death of Mary, and that they had the intention to kill or cause her really serious harm. 
The approach of Johnson J. at first instance in Re A was to develop an analogy with 
Bland to show that the proposed surgery would not be criminal. Does an analogy stand 
up?
1. Could it be said that by removing the `life-support system’ provided by Jodie, the 
hospital would not be performing a positive act but omitting to act?
It has frequently been stated that there is a vital distinction between acts and omissions; 
a positive act that kills cannot be justified even when in the best interests of the patient. 
However much a patient’s continued existence is not in her best interests, a doctor 
apparently is not allowed to perform a positive act, which kills her. In Bland it was 
recognised that there is no moral difference between such an act and an omission with 
the same effect, and that the law’s refusal to countenance the former is a matter of 
policy. Nevertheless, the House of Lords relied on the distinction to justify its decision. 
The lack of any logical or ethical rationale for the positive act/omission dichotomy was 
13 J. Finnis, op. cit.
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noted by Lord Goff. He observed, possibly with more prescience than he realised, that 
the House might be embarking on the slippery slope towards euthanasia14.
In Bland the proposed course of action was difficult to categorise as either an omission 
to act or a positive act. Would the cause of death be the removal of the old feeding-tube, 
the failure to insert a new one, or the failure to supply nutrition through the tube? The 
general view was that it would be absurd if culpability rested on such categorisation. 
The fact that there was to be a positive act, the removal of tube, should not define the 
procedure as homicide.15 The House of Lords held that effectively, it would amount to a 
cessation of treatment. Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that failure to do what you 
have previously done is not, in any ordinary sense, a positive act. Hence, should a 
hospital discontinue treatment by way of life-support machine, the effect would be the 
same as if the treatment had never been initiated.16 The hospital would have omitted to 
act, not committed a positive act, even though someone must have switched the 
machine off. Yet it would clearly be murder if a layperson were to walk into a hospital 
ward and deliberately switch off a patient’s life-support machine. Why would the 
interloper’s behaviour be seen as a positive act of murder, whereas the hospital’s would 
not? According to Lord Goff, the distinction is that the interloper stops the doctor from 
prolonging the patient’s life17. This suggests that the totality of the hospital action is to 
cease to treat; seen as one continuing behaviour18, consisting of a number of acts and 
omissions, the overall conduct of the hospital is the cessation of treatment, an omission 
to act. Whereas where the hospital is engaged in a course of treating and prolonging the 
14Bland,   supra, at 867
15ibid., 881
16ibid., per Lord Goff at 867. But see A.J. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press 1999) p??
17Re A  , supra,  at 867
18 See H. Beynon, `Doctors as Murderers’ [1982] Crim. L.R. 19
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life of a patient, the interloper who switches off life-support is performing only one act, 
a positive act that kills.19 
A problem for the House of Lords in Bland was that even an omission to act can be 
murder, where there is a duty to care for someone. This duty to care for a person may 
arise through contract, parental responsibility, or through having undertaken and begun 
a process of caring.20 This duty includes the provision of basic nourishment for the 
helpless. Since Anthony Bland was being fed through a tube by a hospital which wished 
to discontinue that process, there was a clear murder issue to be resolved. In response, 
the House of Lords argued that the feeding of the patient through a nasogastric tube was 
more than the basic care the hospital is obliged to provide. It amounted to medical 
treatment. Although there is transatlantic authority for this21, it is not clear why all the 
House followed the American Supreme Court in allowing medical opinion to define for 
legal purposes what constitutes medical treatment, (as opposed to the basic care to 
which all patients in hospitals are entitled)22. After all, the consequence of this 
interpretation was literally a matter of life and death for Anthony Bland. Gunn and 
Smith have shown that it is impossible to claim, in the case of a helpless patient, that 
not to feed is not to allow nature to take its course.23 Kennedy and Grubb24 recognise the 
danger of this approach and the difficulty of separating such feeding from the spoon-
feeding of patients who cannot feed themselves. But their solution, that we should 
recognise that the doctor’s obligation is to act in the best interests of the patient25, and 
that this should determine what manner of care the hospital is entitled to withhold, 
19A.J. Ashworth, op. cit, at ??
20 Gibbins and Procter (1918) 17 Cr. App. R. 134; Stone and Dobinson [1978] 2 All E.R. 341
21 Re Claire Conway (1985) 486 A. 2d. 1209: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 
(1990) 110 S. Ct. 2841
22 See J. Finnis, op. cit.: J. Keown, `Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland’ 
(1997) 113 L.Q.R. 481
23 M.J. Gunn and J.C. Smith, `Arthur’s Case and the Right to Life of a Down’s Syndrome Child’ [1985] 
Crim. L.R. 705
24 I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law: Text with Materials (Butterworths 1994)  1230
25 ibid., 1230
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places a lot of faith in the accuracy of judgment and the objectivity of the medical 
profession. If such faith were widespread, the law might feel more comfortable about 
euthanasia as a general practice.
Whatever one may feel about the wisdom of relying on the classification of nasogastric 
feeding as medical treatment, the problems in Re A were very different; could it be 
argued with at least equal validity that the supply of oxygen to Mary’s body from a 
heart and pair of lungs which were not her own amounted to medical treatment? And 
although the distinction between acts and omissions is logically unsound and morally 
irrelevant, it performs a vital function for as long as the courts insist that they cannot 
condone euthanasia. The elastic nature of omission in law gave the court ample 
opportunity in Re A to justify the operation to separate the twins and seems no more 
irrational than to overrule Dudley and Stephens with no attention to its ratio decidendi. 
However, it was held in Re A that the proposed surgery would be a positive act, in that 
it would represent an invasion of Mary’s bodily integrity26. 
There is a second and significant aspect to this discussion. It emerged in Re A that 
Mary’s life could be saved if she were placed on a heart and lung machine after 
separation from Jodie. The hospital said that this would not be normal practice.
It is not something that we would have planned as part of the procedure because 
this is the sort of situation that one would set up if one was looking towards a 
survivor. It is a holding situation…Unless there was a heart and lungs available 
for transplant instantly there would not really be all that much point, and then 
one has to take into context the rest of the problems which the child has, which 
26 Re A, per Ward L.J. at 993
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really do not suggest that there is any point taking on a heart/lung transplant for 
this child27.
If she were to be placed on such a machine, said the Court of Appeal, the hospital could 
subsequently remove it from her on the principles set out in Bland. “If her life were 
being supported, not by Jodie, but by mechanical means, it would be right to withdraw 
that artificial life-support system and allow Mary to die”28. Hence there was apparently 
little point in using the machine in the first place.
Here we can see that although the Court of Appeal claimed that it did not rely on the 
positive act/omission distinction, insofar as it underpins the decision in Bland, the Court 
is forced in this argument to fall back on it. Their Lordships effectively leap-frog the 
direct effect of the operation, which is immediate death, into a Bland analogy in which 
the hospital would merely be ceasing to treat. In doing so, they transform a positive act 
that kills Mary into an omission to act. The same problem informs their use of the 
necessity defence as the justification for the surgery; there would be no necessity in 
killing Mary if her life could be saved afterwards. However, the Court decided that it 
could not, because in the final analysis, the means of saving her could be denied her on 
Bland principles.
2. The withdrawal of life support from Mary would be in her best interests
In Bland, the House of Lords appeared to feel justified in discounting the principle of 
the sanctity of life against their Lordships’ interpretation of the patient’s best interests.29 
All courts appeared willing to engage in language which demonstrates a judicial notion 
27Evidence of paediatric neurosurgeon quoted by Ward L.J., ibid., at 985
28ibid  ., Robert Walker L.J. at 1057
29Following  Re J [1990] 3 All E.R. 930. See I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, op. cit., 1251-1259
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of a metaphysical separation of mind and body, as in Sir Stephen Brown at first instance 
“His spirit has left him and all that remains is the shell of his body”30. This separation 
does not represent the common law approach to life and death,31 and sits oddly with the 
unwillingness discussed above to countenance any suggestion of that Mary was not `a 
life in being’. However, it allows the courts to engage in a balancing act between the 
sanctity of life and a patient’s best interests. This raises the question of what is meant by 
the sanctity of life. Hoffman L.J. in the Court of Appeal in Bland followed Professor 
Dworkin’s argument that the right to life is an aspect of an individual’s right to 
autonomy. There are same ways of dying, and possibly some ways of being kept alive, 
which no one would select, given a free choice. Hence the right to life must involve 
some choice on the manner of one’s dying, as well as of living32. This might be thought 
a precarious line of argument for courts to follow, since it justifies euthanasia, but some 
judges seem attracted by it. “Human dignity and personal privacy belong to every 
person whether living or dying. Yet, the sheer invasiveness and the manipulation of the 
human body which [the treatment] entails; the pitiful and humiliating helplessness of 
the patient’s state, and the degradation and dissolution of all bodily functions invoke 
these values.” 33 It was suggested in Bland that there was something undignified about 
the fact that the hospital was keeping treating its young patient alive. It is not clear why 
this view was taken, and certainly not why it was apparently thought that the manner of 
his treatment robbed him of dignity.
In Bland the hospital could not point to any risk or futility in the treatment he was 
receiving. Here the reasoning of the court centred not on whether the treatment was 
30Bland  , supra, at 832
31 Finnis argues that neither has it a philosophical basis. J Finnis, op. cit.,
32 “Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a horrifying contradiction of his 
life, is a devastating, odious form of tyranny”. R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: an Argument about 
Abortions and Euthanasia (Harper Collins 1993) at 217
33 Auckland Area Health Board v. A-G.  [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 235 per Thomas J. at 245
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worthwhile but on the value of his life. John Keown points out that there was no reason 
to decide that feeding Anthony Bland or providing him with antibiotic treatment for 
infection was not worthwhile, unless it was assumed that his life was not worthwhile34. 
In the Court of Appeal, Butler-Sloss L.J. announced that the sanctity of life was now to 
be balanced in an equation against the quality of life35. Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. said, 
“I cannot conceive what benefit his continued existence could be thought to give him”36
, and Hoffman L.J. declared, “the stark reality is that Anthony Bland is not living a life 
at all”.37 In an Irish case involving a patient with some cognitive function, the Irish 
Supreme Court held that if she were aware of her condition, it would be a terrible 
torment to her.38 How are such assessments justified? Keown39 points out that this 
approach was rejected in the criminal law over a hundred years ago in Dudley and 
Stephens40 in relation to necessity and Howe41 in relation to duress as a defence. The 
law may not ratify the decision of an individual that another should live or die, even 
where another life could be saved, and even if the other’s life is likely to be short or 
uncomfortable. That would be to ask the courts to a judgment as to which human life 
should be preferred over another.42
In Re A the Court of Appeal recognized the strength of the criticisms of the `quality of 
life’ argument, and agreed that it could not be said that it was in Mary’s best interests to 
be killed. She was quite comfortable43. Why then, would it be pointless to keep her on a 
heart and lung machine? Why was it assumed that removal of the machine would 
34 Op. cit.
35 Bland, supra, at 849
36 ibid ., at 839
37 ibid at 855
38 In the Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] I.L.R.M. 410
39 Op. cit.
40Supra   
41 [1987] A.C. 134
42 Op. cit. at 488
43ibid., per  Ward L.J. at 989
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inevitably be justifiable by analogy with Bland? Would she be less comfortable than she 
was with Jodie’s body performing the same function? 
3. Could it be said that that the operation would not cause death? 
Unfortunately the criminal cases on causation are far from clear on the subject of 
hospitals who fail to treat disease or injury (either correctly or at all). In general, 
however, negligent treatment will not break the chain of causation where an individual 
inflicted the original injury. That person will therefore be held to have caused the death 
and be culpable. This is the case even where the doctor has a duty to treat the injury. 44 
Yet in Bland, judges were divided as to whether it could be said that once nasogastric 
feeding were discontinued, the cause of death would be Anthony Bland’s original 
injuries rather than the hospital failure to treat him. Sir Stephen Brown considered that 
if the feeding tubes were removed, the true cause of Anthony Bland’s death would be 
“the massive injuries which he sustained…in the Hillsborough disaster.” 45 There was 
some agreement with this in the Court of Appeal; “The withdrawal of nasogastric 
feeding would amount to an omission to act which would allow causes already present 
in the body to operate and the introduction of an external agency of death. Without the 
tube he would have died from his medical condition “46. But the logic of this argument 
would remove any need for a judicial declaration authorising the discontinuance of 
treatment in cases of this kind. Any hospital could make the decision entirely on its own 
responsibility, claiming that the consequent death was caused by the disease or injury. 
In such a context there would be no need to consider the issue of the patient’s best 
interests at all.
44 Smith  [1959] 2 All E.R. 193: Cheshire [1991] 3 All E.R. 670
45 [1993] 1 All E.R. 821, 833
46 Bland, supra, Butler-Sloss L.J. at 849; cf. Sir Thomas Bingham M.R., at 841
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Hoffman L.J. rightly rejected this approach. Starving a child to death is not allowing 
nature to take its course47. There is a positive duty of humanity, to provide basic 
nourishment, where there is a duty of care and someone is helpless. In the same way, if 
someone is ill and that duty exists, the carer cannot simply withhold it and say the 
illness caused the death. As far as withholding medical treatment is concerned, as 
Kennedy and Grubb point out48 there are some patients who will in fact die of the 
disease or injury, but others who will not. Patients in a persistent vegetative state fall 
into the latter category.49 However, if Mary and Josie were to be separated, so that Mary 
would die, the surgery itself would surely cause her death50, not the fact that she was 
born physically attached .to her sister51. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal recognised that a causation solution would raise 
more questions than it answered. It was irrelevant to their decision in that the judges 
rejected a life-support analogy as far as the joining of the twins and the operation to 
separate were concerned. They did not consider how the argument would have worked 
if Mary were to be placed on life-support after the operation. Conceivably, it could be 
said that if the machine were withdrawn from Mary at some later stage, she would die 
not as a consequence of that, but because of the weakness of her organs. In Auckland 
Area Health Board v Attorney-General52 Thomas J observed in the New Zealand High 
Court that, if it were argued where life-support is removed from patients in extremis the 
cause of death would not be the procedure but the disease itself, then the same could be 
said of a patient with polio being removed from a heart and lung machine who actually 
47ibid.   at 855; cf. Lord Mustill at 892-3
48op  . cit. 1217
49 Bland, supra
50“ just as a lethal injection accelerates the death of a patient at the terminal stage” per Ward L.J., Re A, 
supra,. at 1012
51According to Brooke L.J., the operation would involve a number of invasions of Mary’s bodily 
integrity. The surgeons would have to identify whose organs belonged to whom; hence the procedure 
bore no resemblance to the discontinuance of artificial feeding. It would amount to a positive act which 
would kill Mary. Re A, supra, at 1027
52 Supra
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wants to live. In Mary’s case the cause of death would be the removal of the machine, 
and, as in Re J53 and Bland, it would have to be justified as being in her best interests. 
The Court of Appeal had already concluded that separation from Jodie was not in her 
best interests. So why would removal of a heart and lung machine be different?
Despite the many problems which accompany a causation solution in cases of this 
nature, Robert Walker L.J. appeared to adopt it
Mary would die because she was non-viable, and was designated for death………
.?????
INTENTION
In Re A the Court of Appeal appeared to believe that the surgeons who would operate 
on Jodie and Mary would have the mens rea 54   of murder, specifically, the intention to 
kill. Now, in Bland it is quite clear that the intention to kill would be present when 
treatment was discontinued, albeit with laudable motive, to alleviate suffering. For the 
whole object of the proposed cessation of feeding was to cause Anthony Bland’s 
death.55 However, in Re A, Mary’s death was not desired, although the doctors knew her 
death was virtually certain56. The Court of Appeal considered that therefore the test in 
Woollin57, currently the leading case on the mens rea for murder, would be satisfied. 
But the Woollin test is less than clear-cut. Evidence that a defendant foresaw death or 
really serious bodily harm is evidence from which a jury may, not must, infer intention. 
53 Supra 
54 The state of mind which a prosecutor must prove in relation to a particular offence
55 Although Lord Bingham M.R. suggested that the doctors would not have the required mens rea, but 
he gave no explanation of this: Bland, supra, at 841
56 The Archbishop of Westminster had explained that the doctrine of double effect did not assist: the 
good end (to save Jodie) did not justify the means (killing Mary). See also S. Sheldon and S. 
Wilkinson, op.cit.
57 [1998] 4 All E.R. 103
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There is before the jury, then, a “get-out” clause whereby they may decide that although 
a defendant foresaw death as virtually certain, he or she did not intend it. The House of 
Lords gave no guidance as to when a jury might legitimately do this. William Wilson 
suggests that the presence of `good motive’ might be a justification for an acquittal on 
the grounds that there was no intention. In his example, a motorist driving with 
reasonable care along a narrow mountain cliff turns a bend and discovers a bunch of 
hikers stretched out across the road. Lacking time to brake, his options are to carry on, 
plunging into the group at the likely cost of causing death, or to drive off the cliff “in 
heroic self sacrifice”.58 (If the preference for self is thought to weaken the goodness of 
the good motive, Wilson’s scenario could be strengthened by placing the driver’s 
children with him in the car). Surely, the argument goes, the jury is entitled in this 
instance to conclude that the driver’s foresight of death does not mean he intended to 
kill?
Does this mean that the surgeons proposing to operate on Jodie and Mary lacked 
intention? Curiously, Brooke LJ. said any jury directed on Woollin lines would 
convict59. That seems to miss the point that the case establishes only the basis on which 
a jury is entitled to infer intention. It does not define intention. The problem presented 
by Woollin is in fact a different one. It stems from the fact that Re A concerned a 
hypothetical rather than an actual trial for murder. If Mary’s surgeons were tried for 
murder, the jury would make a decision on the facts as to whether intent was present at 
the time of the operation. They would be likely to conclude that the surgeons foresaw 
Mary’s death as being a virtually certain consequence of their actions. Whether or not 
their wish to save Jodie would lead the jury to conclude that they did not intend to kill 
Mary is a matter of guesswork. The Court of Appeal was not entitled to anticipate how 
58 W. Wilson ,`Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin’ (1999) 62 M.L.R 448
59 Re A, supra,, at 1029
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the jury would resolve the issue. Even if there were no doubt but that the jury would 
acquit of murder (because of lack of intention), a difficulty remains. Intention is not 
required to sustain a verdict of manslaughter, and so the surgeons of St Mary’s would 
be at risk of a manslaughter conviction were they to rely for their defence on denial of 
mens rea alone. And, of course, had Mary been transferred to heart and lung machine 
on a temporary basis, removal from it would have been accompanied by a clear 
intention, since there would be no higher purpose than to let her die.
CONCLUSION
The appeal judges in this case stress that they wish to take Mary’s rights seriously. In 
defence of those rights they claim to eschew an analogy with Bland. Yet the Court 
accepted, apparently without question, the medical view that there was no purpose to be 
served by keeping her alive after the operation. It was taken as read that any artificial 
means of sustaining her could legally be withdrawn at any or at some time 
subsequently. This assumption is fundamental to the court’s espousal of the necessity 
defence in this case. For if there were means of saving Mary, her death would not be the 
necessary price to pay for saving Jodie. However, the assumption that she was doomed 
is based on an undeveloped comparison with Bland. Although the Court of Appeal was 
aware the flaws in that judgment, it became embroiled in precisely the same 
contradictions and moral fudging. However, that enables the Court of Appeal to achieve 
a utilitarian goal (saving one life rather than lose two lives) while talking in terms of the 
right to life and the sanctity of life. It also allows the judges to impose their views upon 
parents from outside the jurisdiction, although those views are highly questionable in 
terms of law, logic and morality. Some of us may read this case and find that we do not 
feel particularly good, after all.
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